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Freedom of or Freedom from Religion?  
An Overview of Issues Pertinent to the Constitutional 
Protection of Religious Rights and Freedom in  
“the New South Africa” 
Lourens du Plessis ∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a previous issue of this Law Review, Johan D. van der Vyver 
proffered an insightful, profound, and markedly exhaustive perspec-
tive of the evolution of church-state relations in South Africa.1 He 
painted an instructive picture of historical developments that shaped 
church-state relations in South Africa prior to the advent of constitu-
tionalism in 1994. He then assessed developments since 1994 
against this historical backdrop. It would be fruitless to duplicate this 
tour de force—especially its historical (pre-1994) dimension. Conse-
quently, this article will supplement van der Vyver’s post-1994 expo-
sition with an overview of more recent developments. Additionally, 
the article will revisit issues that van der Vyver raised, putting a the-
matic spin on them. 
The first thematic concern is the extent to which the protection 
of religious human rights and freedom in South Africa’s Constitu-
tion2 serves to enhance tolerance among a religiously, ethnically, 
economically, and politically diverse population. Religious pluralism, 
 
 ∗ Professor of Public Law, University of Stellenbosch; Director, University of Stellen-
bosch/University of the Western Cape Research Unit for Legal and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion. Financial assistance was provided by the National Research Foundation: Division of Social 
Sciences and Humanities in support of the research on which this article is based. The opinions 
expressed and conclusions arrived at herein are, however, those of the author and should not 
be attributed to the National Research Foundation. 
 1. Johan D. van der Vyver, Constitutional Perspective of Church-State Relations in South 
Africa, 1999 BYU L. REV. 635. For other overviews of the constitutional protection of reli-
gious freedom in South Africa, see Lourens M. du Plessis, Religion, Law and State in South 
Africa, 4 EUR. J. FOR CHURCH AND ST. RES./REVUE EUROPÉENNE DES RELATIONS ÉGLISES-
ÉTAT 221 (1997) and E.F.J. Malherbe, Die Grondwetlike Beskerming van Godsdiensvryheid, 
TYDSKRIF VIR DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG 673 (1998). 
 2. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996). 
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in and of itself, has never been a major source of inter-individual and 
inter-group intolerance in South Africa. However, racial and ethnic 
conflict (including tensions between modernism and traditionalism), 
class tension, and political strife have found expression in the reli-
gious life of a nation where the vast majority profess some kind of re-
ligious affiliation.3 
The second concern is whether, in light of South Africa’s post-
1994 constitutional case law, it is realistic to expect that judicial con-
structions of religious freedom might proceed beyond the mere al-
lowance of a passive toleration of individual religious free exercise. Is 
it realistic to hope that constitutional warranties may be forthcoming 
in order to sustain the identity and integrity of dissimilar religious 
groups and communities, in a country where incongruities inter-
twined with religious life are rife? This expectation is premised on the 
cultivation of active religious tolerance in a state that abstains from 
favoring any particular religious communities or sentiments. 
II. THE TRANSITION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A. The Transitional Constitution 
The product of intense negotiation, South Africa’s first justicia-
ble Constitution (the “transitional” or “1993 Constitution”),4 en-
tered into force on April 27, 1994 (coinciding with the first fully 
democratic elections in the country’s history). This Constitution was 
a transitional one, “provid[ing] a historic bridge between the past of 
a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suf-
fering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of hu-
man rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development 
opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, 
belief or sex.”5 
The transitional Constitution paved the way for the final Consti-
tution. It also made generous provision for the protection of funda-
 
 3. For statistics, see Amanda Gouws & Lourens M. du Plessis, The Relationship Be-
tween Political Tolerance and Religion: The Case of South Africa, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 657, 
659–61 (2000). 
 4. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200, 1993). 
 5. Id. ch. 15, § 251 (National Unity and Reconciliation). These words occurred in a 
most unusual Postscript or Postamble to the 1993 Constitution. 
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mental freedoms, including religious rights6 and other rights condu-
cive to the realization of the same. These other rights include the 
right to equality,7 freedom of expression,8 freedom of association,9 
and others.10 Moreover, religious rights were immune from suspen-
sion during a state of emergency,11 and the limitation of these rights 
was subject to a stricter form of scrutiny than the limitation of most 
other rights.12 Thus, in spite of its transitional nature, the 1993 Con-
stitution effectively protected an impressive catalogue of rights, 
thereby laying a sound foundation for the eventual protection of 
rights, including religious rights, in the final Constitution. Finally, 
the transitional Constitution trail-blazed the rise of a South African 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
B. The Final Constitution 
The final Constitution (or the “1996 Constitution”) was agreed 
on by a Constitutional Assembly and adopted by Parliament. After 
its adoption, compliance with the transitional Constitution’s “Con-
stitutional Principles”13 had to be certified by the Constitutional 
Court.14 The Constitutional Court referred the text back to the As-
sembly because it was of the opinion that, in certain respects, the text 
did not comply with the Constitutional Principles.15 An improved 
text was then resubmitted, and this text eventually withstood judicial 
scrutiny.16 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa17 there-
 
 6. See id. ch. 3, § 14. 
 7. See id. ch. 3, § 8. 
 8. See id. ch. 3, § 15. 
 9. See id. ch. 3, § 17. 
 10. See, e.g., id. ch. 3, §§ 7–35. For a depiction of the “transitional qualities” of the 
1993 Constitution, see generally LOURENS DU PLESSIS & HUGH CORDER, UNDERSTANDING 
SOUTH AFRICA’S TRANSITIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS (1994). 
 11. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200, 1993) ch. 3, § 34(5)(c). 
 12. See id. ch. 3, § 33(1)(b)(aa). For an overview of the protection of religious rights 
under South Africa’s 1993 Constitution, see Lourens M. du Plessis, Religious Human Rights 
in South Africa, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 441 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte Jr. eds., 1996) [hereinafter LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES]. 
 13. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200, 1993) sched. 4. 
 14. See id. ch. 5, § 71(2). 
 15. In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996, 1996 (10) 
BCLR 1253 (CC). 
 16. In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of S. 
Afr. 1996, 1997 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
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upon entered into force on February 4, 1997. This final approved 
1996 Constitution will serve as the principal point of reference in the 
overview that follows. However, much of the jurisprudence consid-
ered in this article is based on the transitional Constitution. 
The 1996 Constitution has, in many respects, been designed to 
inculcate tolerance among South Africans. Passive tolerance means 
that people bear or put up with one another; affirmative tolerance 
means that they understand, accept, and appreciate one another. The 
latter form is worth striving for, but a minimum, basic (albeit pas-
sive) tolerance is preferable to no tolerance at all.18 Some of the gen-
eral value statements in the 1996 Constitution make it clear that the 
reconciliation of individuals, groups, and communities whose inter-
ests are potentially in conflict is one of the Constitution’s priorities. 
For instance, the preamble suggests the significance of national 
reconciliation—in light of a history of suffering and injustice—
thereby connoting the political necessity of positive tolerance.19 The 
explicit protection of the right to freedom of religion and the right 
to religious equality must be understood as part of this project of 
cultivating tolerance. Specific provision is made for the particular 
concerns created by a diversity of religious individuals and communi-
ties, so much so that it may well be said that the Constitution fore-
sees a celebration of religious plurality in South Africa—in other 
words, a high degree of affirmative tolerance. Section 3120 may well 
be understood as enjoining the “religious majority”—whoever they 
may be—to honor the “otherness” of the other. As a result, an era of 
privileging certain understandings of the Christian faith21 has most 
certainly come to an end. Furthermore, the constitutional entrench-
ment of some other rights, including rights that are not so conspicu-
ously religious,22 will help to sustain typical religious activities such as 
preaching, witnessing, proselytizing, and assembling or congregat-
ing. 
The aforementioned dimensions of the Constitution, constitut-
ing points of departure for the protection of religious freedoms, will 
now be considered in light of relevant constitutional jurisprudence, 
 
 17. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996). 
 18. See generally Gouws & du Plessis, supra note 3, at 657–59. 
 19. See infra Part IV.A. 
 20. See infra Part VI.C. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part VII. 
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with particular reference to the following principles: first, the tradi-
tional Christian bias in South African law; second, “the constitu-
tional context,” which includes the potential impact of general con-
stitutional value statements and the interpretation of general 
limitation and suspension clauses on the adjudication of religious 
rights; third, explicit constitutional guarantees of religious rights; 
fourth, constitutional guarantees designed to ensure an evenhanded 
accommodation of particularistic religious concerns and penetrate 
the proverbial wall of separation between church and state; and fifth, 
the entrenchment of rights (other than explicitly religious rights) 
that can secondarily sustain religious activities. 
III. THE TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN BIAS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW23 
Before April 27, 1994, South African law showed a distinct 
Christian bias in several ways: 
• the existence of a series of Sunday observance laws;24 
• censorship legislation25 that introduced blasphemy as a 
criterion for censorship and stated that “[i]n the applica-
tion of this Act the constant endeavour of the population 
of the Republic of South Africa to uphold a Christian 
view of life shall be recognised”;26 
• allowance for only the Christian form of the oath in 
criminal proceedings;27 and 
• a constitutional confession of faith in section 2 of the 
1983 Constitution28 as well as statements showing a bias 
for Christianity, as understood by Afrikaner Calvinists, in 
its preamble. 
The constitutional entrenchment of religious rights since April 
27, 1994 has rendered religiously biased provisions both in statutes 
and in the common law prone to constitutional challenges. Surpris-
 
 23. For a more detailed discussion of instances of this bias and its effects, see van der 
Vyver, supra note 1, at 636–42. 
 24. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Religion, in 23 THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 175, 198–
99 (W.A. Joubert & T.J. Scott eds., 1986). 
 25. See the now-repealed Publications Act 42 of 1974. 
 26. See id. § 1. 
 27. See section 162(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977. Witnesses ob-
jecting to this could make an affirmation in lieu of the oath. Id. § 163. 
 28. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 110, 1983) section 2 reads: “The people of the Republic of 
South Africa acknowledge the sovereignty and guidance of Almighty God.” 
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ingly few of these provisions have been legally challenged so far. 
However, Parliament has in some instances substituted new legisla-
tion for religiously biased legislation.29 The object of the new legisla-
tion has not necessarily been the systematic eradication of statutory 
provisions showing a Christian bias, and the demise of the latter has 
mainly been a byproduct of broadly conceived legislative reforms. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
A. General Constitutional Value Statements 
The eminently conciliatory preamble to the 1996 Constitution 
reads as follows: 
We, the people of South Africa, Recognise the injustices of our 
past; Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our 
land; Respect those who have worked to build and develop our 
country; and Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, 
united in our diversity. 
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this 
Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to: Heal the 
divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights; Lay the foun-
dations for a democratic and open society in which government is 
based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally pro-
tected by law; Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the 
potential of each person; Build a united and democratic South Af-
rica able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family 
of nations. 
May God protect our people. Nkosi Sikelel’ i Afrika. Morena 
boloka setjhaba sa heso. God seën Suid-Afrika. God bless South Af-
rica. Mudzimu fhatutshedza Afurika. Hosi katekisa Afrika.30 
From a religious freedom perspective, the multilingual reference to 
“God” in the closing sentences of the preamble can be seen to favor 
monotheistic beliefs. Whether this is an intentional gesture of intol-
 
 29. Examples of such new legislation are the Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996 
which replaced the Publications Act 42 of 1974, and (arguably also) the Choice on the Termi-
nation of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, which replaced the Abortion and Sterilization Act 2 of 
1975. 
 30. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) preamble. 
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erance towards polytheists and atheists is doubtful, but it is inconsid-
erate nonetheless.31 In the South African context, preambles to a leg-
islated text traditionally have been held to be only of secondary con-
sequence in the interpretation of such a text.32 However, the 
preamble to the constitutional text significantly influences its inter-
pretation.33 
The constitutional protection of rights is premised on human 
dignity, equality, and freedom. These foundational values are men-
tioned in the Constitution’s opening section,34 the article introduc-
ing the Bill of Rights,35 as well as in the general interpretation36 and 
limitation37 clauses. The centrality of human dignity emphasizes the 
importance of promoting respect and understanding in human rela-
tions. This probably accounts for the explicit limitations on freedom 
of expression.38 
B. The Interpretation Clause 
Section 39(1) provides guidelines for the interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution as follows: 
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must 
consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.39 
This provision makes the consideration of international standards for 
the protection of all rights—including religious rights—obligatory 
while permitting resort to the law (including the jurisprudence) of 
other jurisdictions. 
The values of interpretive significance written into the body of 
the constitutional text itself carry as much weight as any other provi-
 
 31. See also van der Vyver, supra note 1, at 649–52. 
 32. LOURENS M. DU PLESSIS, THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 123–25 (1986). 
 33. Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, 1994 (3) BCLR 1 (NmH) 34F–I. In deciding 
the constitutionality of capital punishment, the Constitutional Court also generously relied on 
statements in the unusual Postamble to the transitional Constitution in S. v. Makwanyane, 
1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) paras. 7, 130, 223, 237–38, 244–45. 
 34. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 1, § 1(a). 
 35. See id. ch. 2, § 7(1). 
 36. See id. ch. 2, § 39(1)(a). 
 37. See id. ch. 2, § 36(1). 
 38. See id. ch. 2, § 16(2); cf. infra Part VII. 
 39. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 2, § 39(1). 
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sion of the Constitution. Legally, they have teeth, although their ex-
pansive language renders them susceptible to divergent interpreta-
tions. 
C. The General Limitation and Suspension Clauses 
Fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights of South Af-
rica’s Constitution,40 including religious rights, may be limited pur-
suant to stipulations of a general limitation clause, which reads as fol-
lows: 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law 
of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors including: 
(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose 
of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) 
less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.41 
 The comparable provision in the transitional Constitution was 
section 33(1). This section stipulated more strict conditions for the 
limitation of some specified rights, including religious rights. The 
limitation of these rights, in addition to being reasonable, also had to 
be necessary.42 The notion of a “more strict limitation test” is absent 
from the 1996 Constitution. 
Section 36(2) of the 1996 Constitution precludes the limitation 
of any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights, except as provided in 
section 36(1) “or in any other provision of the Constitution.”43 Section 
36(1) is therefore not the sole constitutional source of conditions 
pursuant to which constitutionally entrenched rights can be limited. 
Rights can, for instance, also be demarcated by internal modifiers,44 
specific limiting provisions,45 the effect of other rights entrenched in 
 
 40. See generally id. ch. 2. 
 41. Id. § 36(1). 
 42. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200, 1993) ch. 3, § 33(1)(b)(bb). 
 43. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 2, § 36(2) (emphasis added). 
 44. The rights to assemble, demonstrate, picket, and petition must be exercised “peace-
fully and unarmed.” See id. ch. 2, § 17. 
 45. See, e.g., id. ch. 2, § 16(2) (limiting the right to freedom of expression entrenched in 
section 16(1)). 
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the Bill of Rights,46 and constitutional provisions outside of the Bill 
of Rights.47 However, a non-constitutional precept of law arguably 
cannot limit a fundamental right entrenched in the Bill of Rights 
other than in conformity with the stipulations of section 36(1).48 
During the first six years of its existence, the Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence on the limitation of rights has sought to give 
content to the limitation clauses in two successive constitutional 
texts. Guidelines gleaned from jurisprudence on the construction of 
the limitation clause in the transitional Constitution49 have been 
written into the text of the limitation clause in the final Constitu-
tion.50 Paragraphs (a) through (e) of section 36(1) clearly derive 
from dicta of the President of the Constitutional Court, Arthur 
Chaskalson, in S. v. Makwanyane.51 These paragraphs explicate the 
rudiments of the widely acknowledged test of proportionality, which 
was designed to inhibit an unbalanced and unrestrained limitation of 
rights.52 
It is unnecessary to deal extensively with the guidelines and pro-
cedures that have emerged from the South African jurisprudence on 
the limitation of fundamental rights in general,53 or religious rights 
in particular.54 It will become clear in the course of the further dis-
cussion, however, that the adjudication of religious freedom issues 
has hinged largely on the courts’ understanding of the effect of a 
general limitation clause in matters of this kind. This is not surpris-
 
 46. For example, adjudicating the offence of crimen iniuiria, a court has to consider the 
extent to which the victim’s right to respect and protection of his dignity (section 10) limits 
the perpetrator’s freedom of speech (section 16(1)). Self-defense raises issues regarding the 
limitation of the right to security of the person of an attacker (section 12(1)) vis-à-vis that of 
the “victim” defending himself. 
 47. A citizen’s right to stand for and hold a public office (section 19(3)(b)) is circum-
scribed by section 47(1), which does not form part of the Bill of Rights but lays down certain 
requirements for membership in the National Assembly. 
 48. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) § 36(2). 
 49. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200, 1993) ch. 3, § 33(1). 
 50. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 2, § 36(1). 
 51. 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) para. 104. 
 52. See generally JOHAN DE WAAL ET AL., THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 143–44 
(3d ed. 2000). 
 53. For helpful overviews, see id. ch. 7; MATTHEW CHASKALSON ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA ch. 12 (1996). 
 54. For a helpful exposition of general principles applicable to the limitation of religious 
rights, see Makau wa Mutua, Limitations on Religious Rights: Problematizing Religious Free-
dom in the African Context, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 417. 
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ing, given the judicial inclination to reduce religious controversies to 
issues of the free exercise of religion and to avoid the thornier ques-
tion of how to treat dissimilar religious institutions and communities 
evenhandedly. The South African jurisprudence on the constitutional 
protection of religious rights and freedom can therefore not be un-
derstood in isolation from the effect that the general limitation 
clause in the Bill of Rights can conceivably have on the adjudication 
of rights issues.55 
Religious freedom is high on the priority list of basic freedoms 
singled out for protection in national as well as international human 
rights instruments. Some regard it as “the most sacred of all free-
doms.”56 It “appeared as the first fundamental human right in politi-
cal instruments of both national and international character long be-
fore the idea of systematic protection of civil and political rights was 
developed.”57 Rights that are so eminently fundamental are, in terms 
of international standards, usually regarded as non-derogable.58 This 
means that they cannot be suspended even during a publicly pro-
claimed emergency when the life of the nation is threatened.59 Article 
4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ex-
plicitly provides for the non-derogability of the religious rights and 
freedom enshrined in Article 18 of that Covenant. The rule of non-
 
 55. Denise Meyerson proposes that proof of “neutral harm” on which “all reasonable 
people” can agree should be used as a test to determine the sustainability of limitations on the 
right to freedom of expression and religious rights. DENISE MEYERSON, RIGHTS LIMITED 
(1997). She claims that reliance on this test will maximize the free exercise of these rights. See 
id. But see Janet Epp Buckingham, The Limits of Rights Limited, 11 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 
133 (2000) (criticizing Meyerson’s proposals as being too freedom-centered). 
 56. HUMAN RIGHTS FOR SOUTH AFRICANS 124 (Mike Robertson ed., 1991). 
 57. Karl Josef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
209 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); see also HUMAN RIGHTS FOR SOUTH AFRICANS, supra note 56, 
at 124. See also, for example, the first paragraph of the Agreement of the People (of England) 
of 28 Oct. 1647. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which deals with religious 
freedom at a federal level, was proposed in 1789 (the same year in which the Constitution itself 
came into operation) and was ratified shortly after the commencement of the Constitution. See 
J.D. VAN DER VYVER, DIE JURIDIESE FUNKSIE VAN STAAT EN KERK 104 (1972). 
 58. With reference to the 1993 Constitution, in section 34, “non-derogable” must be 
read as “non-suspendable.” 
 59. For a discussion of the general principle with reference to the right to life, see B.G. 
Ramcharan, The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 14–17 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985); W.P. Gormley, The Right to Life 
and the Rule of Non-derogatability: Peremptory Norms of Jus Gogens, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 120. 
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derogability has probably also become part of customary interna-
tional law binding on every state irrespective of whether it is a party 
to any international convention or covenant.60 
Section 37 of South Africa’s 1996 Constitution provides for de-
cidedly strict conditions on which constitutionally entrenched rights 
can be suspended during a state of emergency. Some rights are non-
suspendable or non-derogable,61 but no section 15 rights62 have 
been included in this category. In the transitional Bill of Rights, all 
of the comparable section 14 rights were non-derogable.63 The 
transitional Constitution thus conformed to international standards 
more strictly than the final Constitution. The suspension of section 
15 during an emergency will, for instance, exclude constitutional 
protection for nonconformist conscientious objection to 
conscription. 
V. SPECIFIC CONCERNS REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF 
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND FREEDOM 
A. Freedom of Religion 
Section 15(1) of the 1996 Constitution unequivocally en-
trenches the right to religious freedom: “[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.”64 This 
provision goes beyond protecting the right to freedom of religion in 
its narrow connotation and also guarantees freedom of conscience, 
thought, belief, and opinion. This probably includes the right not to 
observe any religion at all. One is presumably entitled to believe 
whatever one wants to, but acting on one’s beliefs (that is, exercising 
them) is not always uncontroversial. 
Notably absent from section 15(1) is a provision akin to the es-
tablishment clause in the First Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States of America: “Congress shall make no law respect-
 
 60. Louis Henkin, Human Rights, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 268, 271 (1985). 
 61. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 2, § 37(5)(c). 
 62. Section 15 rights include “the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, 
belief and opinion.” Id. ch. 2, § 15(1). 
 63. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200, 1993) ch. 3, § 34(5)(c). 
 64. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 2, § 15(1). 
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ing an establishment of religion . . . .”65 There is a difference of opin-
ion on whether section 15(1) of the South African Constitution 
should be understood to include the establishment proscriptions of 
the First Amendment as they have been understood and applied in 
the United States.66 The constitutional protection of religious rights 
and freedom is arguably better off without the narrowly conceived 
version of the establishment clause, which has resulted in a strict 
separation of state and church as well as of politics and organized re-
ligion.67 This separationism makes for an official freedom from relig-
ion rather than individuals’ freedom of religion in religiously like-
minded groups, communities, and institutions. Tolerance of 
religious diversity goes beyond putting up with the free exercise of 
divergent religious beliefs and practices. It also entails the even-
handed treatment of diverse religions and of religious groups, com-
munities, and institutions with potentially conflicting interests. A 
broadly conceived establishment clause can play a significant role in 
guaranteeing such treatment. The equality clause in the South Afri-
can Constitution arguably caters to such expansively understood es-
tablishment concerns. 
B. Equality of Religion 
Section 9(1) of the South African Constitution guarantees equal-
ity before and equal protection of the law. Section 9(3) then pro-
scribes unfair discrimination “against anyone on one or more 
grounds” and lists a number of grounds explicitly.68 Included in this 
list are religion, conscience, and belief.69 Protection of religious 
rights and freedom under the equality clause is arguably as significant 
and indispensable as their protection under section 15(1). However, 
as will be seen from the survey of South African constitutional juris-
prudence on religious rights, the courts have not really had (or have 
not sufficiently availed themselves of) the opportunity to fully ex-
plore the safeguarding potential of the constitutional guarantee of 
 
 65. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. 
 66. See van der Vyver, supra note 1, at 652–53; Malherbe, supra note 1, at 698. See also 
the discussion of S. v. Lawrence, 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC), infra Part V.C. 
 67. John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green, The American Constitutional Experiment in 
Religious Human Rights: The Perennial Search for Principles, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 12, at 497, 547–53. 
 68. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 2, § 9(3). 
 69. See id. 
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religious equality.70 The tendency thus far has been to put all the 
eggs of judicial argumentation in support of the protection of reli-
gious rights in a freedom basket instead.71 
An evenhanded treatment of religions as well as of religious 
groups, communities, and institutions presupposes the absence of 
the proverbial wall of separation between church and state. Some 
positive action on the part of the state is called for to officially vouch 
for evenhandedness without, however, sacrificing impartiality. Even-
handed treatment, after all, is also equal and therefore non-partisan 
treatment. 
C. Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
In S. v. Lawrence (“Seven-Eleven”),72 three employees of Seven-
Eleven chain stores were convicted in separate cases in a magistrate’s 
court of contravening section 90(1) of the Liquor Act,73 which pro-
scribes wine sales on Sundays. On appeal before the Constitutional 
Court, Solberg challenged the constitutionality of section 90(1), 
contending that the prohibition of wine sales on Sunday infringes 
the right to freedom of religion of those citizens who have no reli-
gious objection to such sales. The right to freedom of religion was 
entrenched in the first part of section 14(1) of the transitional Con-
stitution,74 the precursor to the similarly phrased section 15(1) of the 
final Constitution.75 There were high expectations that the Seven-
Eleven judgment could serve as a benchmark precedent on the pro-
tection of religious rights and freedom, but a number of factors im-
 
 70. See, e.g., S. v. Lawrence, 1997 (10) BCLR at 1348. This was the first case before 
South Africa’s Constitutional Court where the protection of religious rights and freedom un-
der the Constitution was at issue. As will be shown, the court failed to reach unanimity on the 
applicability of the guarantee of religious equality to establishment concerns. 
 71. It should be added, however, that there have been too few cases and that it is there-
fore still too early to draw any definite conclusions. 
 72. 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC). For a critical assessment of this judgment, see Janet 
Epp Buckingham, Religious Freedom and Wine Sales on Sunday, 10 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 
117 (1999). 
 73. Act 27 of 1989. 
 74. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200, 1993) ch. 3, § 14(1). The second part of section 14(1) 
states that the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion includes 
“academic freedom in institutions of higher learning.” 
 75. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996). The freedom of expression clause in this Constitu-
tion now caters to academic freedom. See id. ch. 2, § 16(1)(d). 
3DUP-FIN.DOC 6/25/01  9:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
452 
peded this. First, the full record of evidence was not before the Con-
stitutional Court because the appellants did not follow the proper 
procedure in bringing the case to the latter forum. Second, the 
Seven-Eleven case was not actually perceived as dealing with religious 
freedom but rather with commercial interests. No religious groups, 
for instance, presented the court with their understanding of the na-
ture and scope of religious freedom, and the court itself intimated 
that it was possible to properly dispose of the matter without really 
turning it into a religious rights dispute. 
Six justices of the Constitutional Court agreed that the appeal 
should be dismissed, but they were divided 4-2 on the reasoning. 
Three justices thought that the appeal should be allowed, using es-
sentially the same legal arguments that the minority of two judges in 
the first group used. This latter 5-4 division is of importance for pur-
poses of the present discussion because it involves a difference of 
opinion on questions of religious freedom vis-à-vis religious equality, 
in other words, on “free exercise” versus “establishment” concerns. 
The President of Court, Arthur Chaskalson, writing on behalf of 
the four, held that religious equality was not really at issue in the 
Seven-Eleven case. This was because Solberg relied solely on the free-
dom of religion clause in the transitional Constitution (section 
14(1)) to challenge section 90(1) of the Liquor Act and not on the 
equality clause (section 8) as well. This meant that the court was 
called upon to deal with issues of religious free exercise only. Had 
the appellant also explicitly relied on the non-discrimination 
provision in the equality clause (section 8(2)), the kind of concern to 
which a broadly conceived establishment clause caters might have 
entered into the picture.76 
The five argued on the assumption that equality concerns had to 
be catered to anyway. This prompted the conclusion that section 
90(1) indeed encroached on the right to religious freedom as guar-
anteed in section 14(1) of the transitional Constitution.77 Justices 
Sachs and Mokgoro, however, thought that such apparent en-
croachment was trivial and constitutionally justified on the strength 
of the general limitation clause in the transitional Bill of Rights.78 
They accordingly held that section 90(1) had to survive constitu-
 
 76. S. v. Lawrence, 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC). 
 77. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200, 1993) § 14(1). 
 78. Id. § 33. The comparable provision in the 1996 Constitution is section 36. 
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tional review.79 
Justice O’Regan (writing on behalf of three of the five) 
succinctly expressed her disagreement in the following terms: 
I . . . cannot agree with Chaskalson P when he concludes that be-
cause the provisions do not constrain individuals’ “right to enter-
tain such religious beliefs as they might choose, or to declare their 
religious beliefs openly, or to manifest their religious beliefs”, there 
is no infringement of section 14 . . . . In my view, the requirements 
of the Constitution require more from the legislature than that it 
refrain from coercion. It requires in addition that the legislature re-
frain from favoring one religion over others. Fairness and even-
handedness in relation to diverse religions is a necessary component 
of freedom of religion.80 
The approach of the five is more conducive to the promotion of 
religious tolerance than that of the four. Putting up with (often 
esoteric) manifestations of religious beliefs is not the hallmark of 
tolerating religious eccentricities. In political terms, a state’s 
evenhanded treatment of divergent religious convictions and the 
realization of these convictions and their effects in societal life 
probably does more to evidence (and enhance) positive tolerance. 
The real freedom of religion issue in the Seven-Eleven case was how 
to accommodate certain Christians’ objection to the sale of liquor on 
their holy day against the acquiescence of Christians and non-
Christians who do not really mind. 
The four furthermore saw Sunday as a general day of rest and not 
necessarily a day of religious significance.81 This fabrication was un-
called for. It is impossible to purge Sunday of its religious signifi-
cance. At any rate, had Sunday been a general day of rest, then wine 
and liquor should arguably be more freely available on this day than 
on normal days of work! It is certainly Sunday’s characteristic reli-
gious significance, rather than its being a general day of rest, that had 
given rise to the prohibition of wine sales. All other “closed days” for 
the sale of wine (in addition to Sunday) are also Christian holidays.82 
The four’s strategy of secularist sanitization designed to mini-
 
 79. S. v. Lawrence, 1997 (10) BCLR at 1348. 
 80. Id. para. 128. 
 81. See id. paras. 95–96. 
 82. See id. para. 125. 
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mize the constitutionalization of a religious issue is not foreign to 
the Constitutional Court. For instance, in certifying the Constitution 
of the Western Cape Province,83 the Court had to decide whether 
the opening words of the preamble to that constitution—“In hum-
ble submission to Almighty God”—violated the right to religious 
freedom under section 15(1) of the national Constitution. Similar 
phrases introduced the preambles to South Africa’s three apartheid 
constitutions between 1910 and 1983. In these constitutions, this 
phrase undoubtedly verbalized Afrikaner-Calvinist monotheism. The 
Constitutional Court, however, thought that the phrase in the Con-
stitution of the Western Cape is, its dubious origin notwithstanding, 
merely of ceremonial significance, and thus religiously neutral.84 One 
wonders whether it is coincidence that this phrase has survived in the 
Constitution of the only South African province in which the Na-
tional Party—the dominant party in the apartheid era— still held 
power at the time. A more realistic and credible finding by the court 
would have been that the contested phrase expresses religious senti-
ments but that (in a post-apartheid dispensation) these are consistent 
with guarantees of religious freedom in the national Constitution. 
Such a finding would still have been open to criticism, but at least it 
would not have been ridiculous! 
In Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of Education of 
the Government of RSA,85 an organization of concerned Christian 
parents approached a High Court to strike down section 10 of the 
South African Schools Act.86 This provision proscribes corporal pun-
ishment in any public or independent/private school. The applicant 
contended that, according to the religious beliefs of its members, 
corporal punishment was part and parcel to the upbringing of chil-
dren. The applicant sought to have corporal punishment reinstated 
in at least those Christian private schools under its auspices.87 Justice 
Liebenberg, in refusing the application, noted that the applicants’ re-
liance on biblical authority allegedly in favor of the physical chas-
tisement of children also indicated that only the parents of the chil-
dren themselves (and not school officials in loco parentis) were 
 
 83. In re Certification of the Constitution of the Western Cape 1997, 1997 (9) BCLR 
1167 (CC). 
 84. See id. para. 28. 
 85. 1999 (9) BCLR 951 (SE). 
 86. Act 84 of 1996. 
 87. See Christian Educ. S. Afr., 1999 (9) BCLR at 954A–C. 
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entitled to administer corporal punishment.88 
The case was taken on appeal to the Constitutional Court,89 
where Justice Albie Sachs handed down a carefully reasoned judg-
ment dismissing the appeal. The gist of his reasoning was that sec-
tion 10 of the Schools Act imposes a constitutionally acceptable 
limitation (that is, one surviving scrutiny in terms of the 
Constitution’s general limitation clause90) on parents’ free exercise of 
their religious beliefs. He deliberately refrained from expressing any 
view on what, in constitutional terms, the implications of parents’ 
own exercise of their religious belief in corporal punishment for their 
children might be. However, according to Justice Sachs, a statute 
that precludes parents from authorizing a school to administer such 
punishment does not, if all relevant considerations are carefully 
weighed, impose a constitutionally untenable limitation on the 
parents’ free exercise of their religious beliefs.91 
In adopting this line of reasoning, Justice Sachs under-
emphasized what schools and teachers should be permitted to do in 
a country where a modern-day constitution guarantees adherence to 
the values “that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom.”92 A line of reasoning catering 
to this kind of concern would have been commendable because it 
would have proceeded beyond the adjudication of a religious rights 
issue in a strictly libertarian and individualistic free exercise vein. 
In a postscript to his judgment, Justice Sachs lamented the fact 
that there was no one before the court representing the interests of 
the children concerned.93 He thought that the children would have 
been capable of articulate expression: “[a]lthough both the State and 
the parents were in a position to speak on their behalf, neither was 
able to speak in their name.”94 A curator ad litem should thus have 
been appointed to represent the interests of the children whose con-
tribution would have “enriched the dialogue.”95 
 
 88. See id. at 958A–959D. 
 89. Christian Educ. S. Afr. v. Minister of Educ., 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC). 
 90. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 2, § 36. 
 91. See Christian Educ. S. Afr., 2000 (10) BCLR at paras. 29–52. 
 92. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 2, § 39(1)(a); see also id. ch. 2, §§ 1(a), 
36(1)(a). See also supra Part IV.A. 
 93. Christian Educ. S. Afr., 2000 (10) BCLR at para. 53. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 53. 
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To date, one of the most difficult and controversial free exercise 
of religion cases to come before a South African court concerned the 
professional future of Gareth Prince. A Rastafarian, Prince was a con-
sumer of cannabis sativa (or “dagga”) for spiritual, medicinal, culi-
nary, and ceremonial purposes as an integral part of practicing his re-
ligion. After having successfully completed his legal studies, Prince 
became eligible to be registered as a candidate attorney doing com-
munity service. Because Prince had been convicted twice of possess-
ing dagga, there were questions as to whether he was fit to be regis-
tered as a candidate attorney, especially in light of his declared 
intention to continue using dagga. The Law Society of the Cape of 
Good Hope refused his registration, whereupon he challenged the 
society’s decision in the Cape High Court.96 The court held that the 
statutory prohibition on the use of dagga was meant to protect pub-
lic safety, order, health, and morals and that these considerations 
outweighed the right of Rastafarians to practice their religion 
through the use of dagga. Thus, the court refused to overturn the 
law society’s decision.97 
Prince appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal,98 which is 
South Africa’s court of final resort in the adjudication of all but 
constitutional issues. His appeal was dismissed, but he has since 
appealed to the Constitutional Court, the final court of appeal in 
constitutional matters. At the time of this article’s printing, the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment in this matter was still pending. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Prince’s case is sus-
pect whether or not one agrees with the outcome. Overawed by the 
prospect of possibly admitting a dangerous dagga smoker to the dis-
tinguished ranks of the legal fraternity, the court gave little regard to 
what the free exercise right of a Rastafarian, or any other religious 
adherent, by definition entails. The court limited the right before 
making an effort to define it and to determine its scope. This is a 
rights-unfriendly manner of dealing with fundamental entitlements 
(including the right to religious freedom). It would have been cold 
comfort for Prince if the court, taking his religious free exercise 
rights more seriously, had nonetheless concluded that it could not 
sanction a prospective attorney’s (or Rastafarian’s) consumption of 
 
 96. Prince v. President of the Law Soc’y, 1998 (8) BCLR 976 (C). 
 97. Id. at 985D–G, 994H. 
 98. Prince v. President of the Law Soc’y, 2000 (3) SA 845 (SCA). 
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dagga for religious purposes. However, a judgment along these lines 
would have been a more prized contribution to the evolution of a 
constitutional jurisprudence on religious rights. 
South African courts have shown an alertness to broadly con-
ceived establishment concerns (that is, the evenhanded treatment of 
diverse religious beliefs) in some cases where religion, as such, was 
not at issue, but the controversies had strong religious overtones. 
The tendency in such cases has been for courts, ostensibly, to refrain 
from selectively privileging certain religious beliefs in dealing with 
those controversies. In Case v. Minister of Safety and Security,99 the 
constitutionality of measures proscribing the possession of porno-
graphic material was considered not as a religious issue but as a pos-
sible infringement of the rights to privacy and freedom of expression. 
In Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v. Minister of 
Health,100 the applicants approached the Pretoria High Court for an 
order to strike down South Africa’s eminently permissive Choice on 
the Termination of Pregnancy Act.101 This Act freely permits abor-
tion on the mother’s request during the first trimester of pregnancy. 
The applicants challenged the Act, relying on the entrenchment of 
the right to life in section 11 of the Constitution. The court dodged 
the controversy and upheld an exception to the applicants’ sum-
mons, alleging that fetal life is not “life” as protected under section 
11.102 An attempt was thus made to keep the controversy over the 
beginning of human life out of the judicial arena. However, the 
court’s choice can hardly be described as religiously or morally neu-
tral, for it privileged beliefs that deny fetal life the status of human 
life.103 
VI. PENETRATING THE WALL OF SEPARATION 
As indicated previously,104 U.S. jurisprudence on the establish-
ment clause has developed to a point where the evenhanded treat-
 
 99. 1996 (5) BCLR 609 (CC). 
 100. 1998 (11) BCLR 1434 (T). 
 101. Act 92 of 1996. 
 102. See Christian Lawyers, 1998 (11) BCLR at 1441H–1443C, 1444A–1446D. 
 103. For an insightful discussion of the Christian Lawyers case, see Tjakie Naudé, The 
Value of Life: A Note on Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v. Minister of Health, 
15 S.A. PUB. L. 541 (1999). 
 104. See infra Part V.A. 
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ment of religion has often come to mean the state’s “non-treatment” 
of any religious matters whatsoever.105 The text of the final South Af-
rican Constitution does not echo a similar sentiment but creates 
room for the state to take positive measures to ensure an evenhanded 
accommodation of religious concerns instead. 
A. Religious Observances at State Institutions 
Section 15(2) of the South African Constitution explicitly au-
thorizes the conduct of religious observances at state or state-aided 
institutions (e.g., schools, prisons, and state hospitals). However, 
certain conditions must be met, namely, that the exercise of said ob-
servances follow rules made by appropriate public authorities,106 that 
observances are conducted on an equitable basis,107 and that atten-
dance is voluntary.108 This provision makes it possible for the state—
without enjoining it109—to actively acknowledge religious sentiments 
and practices without subscribing to them. The Constitution, in 
other words, allows the state’s “proactive tolerance” of religious 
practices in public and semi-public institutions, and safeguards action 
taken to achieve this objective against constitutional challenges alleg-
ing religious bias. At the same time, section 15(2) seeks to counter 
conduct that could further religious intolerance by laying down the 
very conditions referred to. 
In Wittmann v. Deutscher Schulverein,110 the Pretoria High 
Court held that the conditions in section 14(2) of the transitional 
Constitution, the similarly worded precursor to section 15(2), do 
not apply to a private school subsidized by the state to the extent of 
R1.5 million per year, since such a school is not “a state-aided insti-
tution.” This judgment raises serious questions as to the precise 
meaning of “state-aided institutions.” Justice Van Dijkhorst used 
very technical (almost artificial) arguments to conclude that the 
 
 105. For various modes of institutional accommodation of the church-state relationship, 
see Janet Epp Buckingham, Realising Religious Freedom: The Application and Limitations of 
the Canadian Understanding of Religious Freedom to South Africa ch. 3 (1998) (unpublished 
LLD thesis) (on file with author). 
 106. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 2, § 15(2)(a). 
 107. See id. ch. 2, § 15(2)(b). 
 108. See id. ch. 2, § 15(2)(c). 
 109. The introductory sentence to section 15(2) states that the said observances “may be 
conducted.” Id. ch. 2, § 15(2). 
 110. 1999 (1) BCLR 92 (T). 
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school in question was not “state aided.” He rightly pointed out that 
section 14(2) evidences the state’s disinclination to erect walls of 
separation between itself and religion, but then overlooked another 
equally significant concern, namely, that financial aid provided by the 
state not be invoked to enforce religious beliefs and practices upon 
people against their will. 
The Wittmann case was decided under the transitional Constitu-
tion, which made but modest provision for the enforcement of con-
stitutionally entrenched rights against non-organs of the state. It is 
doubtful that the line of reasoning in this case will be sustainable un-
der the 1996 Constitution. Section 8(2) of this Constitution makes 
the Bill of Rights binding upon “a natural or a juristic person if, and 
to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of 
the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.”111 
B. Recognition of Personal and Family Law 
Section 15(3)(a) of the Constitution authorizes legislation rec-
ognizing marriages under systems of religious, personal, or family 
law. However, no right is entrenched and the legislation would not 
automatically be exempt from constitutional challenges, because rec-
ognition is required to be consistent with section 15 and with the 
Constitution. This provision caters to concerns peculiar to some reli-
gious minorities, but is also a source of political controversy. Human 
rights activists (and feminists in particular) complain of the fact that 
some religious systems of personal and family law discriminate 
against married women.112 Section 15(3), so it is feared, will not be-
get the advancement of the status of women in these communities. 
Be that as it may, since the commencement of the transitional Con-
stitution, some significant case law on the recognition of religious 
marriages has called conventional prejudices and chronic intolerance 
of the majority into question in circumstances where it was to the 
advantage of married women. 
 
 111. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 2, § 8(2) (emphasis added). 
 112. Najma Moosa, An Analysis of the Human Rights and Gender Consequences of the 
New South African Constitution and Bill of Rights with Regard to the Recognition and Im-
plementation of Muslim Personal Law (MPL) (1997) (unpublished LLD thesis) (on file with 
author), however, concludes that the recognition of Muslim Personal Law subject to the Con-
stitution is feasible, both theologically and from a human rights point of view, on the strength 
of the particular understanding of the teachings of Islam that she proposes. 
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South African courts traditionally held that marriages under 
Muslim rites are polygamous and that on public policy grounds they 
should not enjoy legal recognition.113 It made no difference whether 
a marriage was in fact polygamous or not: the potential for a de facto 
monogamous union to become polygamous sufficed to attract the 
aversion of mainstream jurisprudence. Section 15(3) of the Constitu-
tion to some extent challenges this prejudice—even though, as was 
pointed out, the provision does not guarantee a right to have reli-
gious marriages recognized. 
In Ryland v. Edros,114 a case dealing with a divorced Muslim 
woman’s claim for maintenance, the Cape High Court held that the 
transitional Constitution had the effect of assuaging conventional 
prejudices about Muslim marriages, especially those that are mo-
nogamous in fact. As previously noted, a potentially polygamous 
Muslim marriage was not officially recognized. Thus, a wife to such a 
union could claim maintenance ex contractu but not ex lege from her 
husband. However, because the contract of marriage between a 
Muslim husband and wife conceivably violated the boni mores 
(“good morals”), any claim to maintenance (professing to be legally 
justified) was thought to be unenforceable.115 However, in Ryland, 
the court held that constitutional values call into question a “public 
policy” that reflects the preferences and prejudices of only one (albeit 
predominant) section of a plural society.116 
Ryland potentially represented a step forward for widowed Mus-
lim women. Under the South African law of delict, the claim of the 
dependant can be brought against a perpetrator who intentionally or 
negligently killed a dependant’s “breadwinner.” The plaintiff must 
prove that the deceased had a legal duty (and not, for instance, 
merely a contractual obligation) to support him or her.117 The de-
pendant’s claim has always been available to a spouse who was law-
fully married under civil law and who had an ex lege right to support 
against the deceased. However, a spouse who was married under 
 
 113. Elsje Bonthuys & Lourens du Plessis, Whither the Validity of Marriages Concluded 
Under a System of Religious Law Under the Transitional Constitution: Kalla v. The Master, 
1994 (4) BCLR 79 (T), 10 S.A. PUB. L. 200, 201–02 (1995). 
 114. 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C). 
 115. Ismail v. Ismail, 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A). 
 116. 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C) 91I, 92B, 92I–93B. 
 117. van der Vyver, supra note 1, at 662; J.R. Midgley, Delict, in 8(1) THE LAW OF 
SOUTH AFRICA para. 38 (W.A. Joubert et al. eds., First Reissue, 1995). 
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Muslim law and whose marriage enjoyed no legal recognition only 
had a contractual right to support against the deceased, and this 
“lesser entitlement” precluded reliance on the dependant’s claim.118 
A veritable breakthrough for these disadvantaged women was the 
unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Amod v. 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund.119 Not only did the court 
find that a former spouse to a Muslim marriage could successfully in-
voke the dependant’s claim, but, in doing so, it explicitly refrained 
from constitutionalizing the issue.120 Assessing the boni mores in 
South Africa at the time when the plaintiff’s alleged cause of action 
arose (that is, the date on which the spouse was killed), the court 
concluded that a “new ethos” had by then “informed the determina-
tion of the boni mores of the community.”121 This ethos is substan-
tially different from the one that spawned the traditional non-
recognition of “potentially polygamous” unions.122 According to 
Chief Justice Mahomed, the political and constitutional changes that 
had taken place up to the spouse’s death were all evidence of the 
“new ethos of tolerance, pluralism and religious freedom”123 that 
pointed to the legal recognition of a de facto monogamous Muslim 
marriage for purposes of the defendant’s claim. 
C. Minorities 
Section 31(1) of the Constitution recognizes, but does not di-
rectly guarantee,124 the right of persons belonging to cultural, reli-
gious, or linguistic communities to enjoy their culture, practice their 
religion, and use their language.125 They also have the right to form, 
join, and maintain cultural, religious, and linguistic associations and 
other organs of civil society. This provision can be relied on to vouch 
 
 118. This was held in a series of cases of which Seedat’s Executors v. The Master, 1917 
A.D. 302 and Ismail v. Ismail, 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) were the leading ones. Section 31 of the 
Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963 explicitly avails a (female) spouse to a black customary 
union, which formerly was not a legally recognized marriage, of the dependant’s claim. 
 119. 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA). 
 120. See id. para. 30. 
 121. Id. para. 21. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. para. 20. 
 124. Persons enjoying protection may not be denied the rights enumerated in the para-
graph. 
 125. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 2, § 31(1). 
3DUP-FIN.DOC 6/25/01  9:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
462 
for minority concerns. A Commission for the Promotion and Protec-
tion of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities 
has to monitor the realization of section 31 rights.126 
D. Education 
All have the right to establish and maintain, at their own ex-
pense, independent educational institutions on condition that there 
be no discrimination on the basis of race, that such institutions be 
registered with the state, and that their standards not be inferior to 
those of comparable public institutions.127 “[S]tate subsidies for in-
dependent educational institutions” are not precluded.128 Section 
29(3) of the final Constitution, unlike its predecessor, section 32(c) 
of the transitional Constitution, does not explicitly mention “a 
common culture, language or religion” as legitimate grounds for the 
establishment of independent educational institutions. The more 
inclusive wording of the former, however, certainly authorizes the 
establishment of such institutions on the said grounds too. 
In the case In re the School Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng),129 
the Constitutional Court held that the right to establish independent 
schools is a defensive right enjoining the state not to interfere with 
the establishment of such schools. The state itself cannot be required 
to provide schools catering to peculiar concerns (such as language, 
culture, or religion). The state is, in other words, required to tolerate 
the establishment of private (including religious) educational 
institutions without actively participating in the process of such 
establishment. 
VII. OTHER RIGHTS THAT SUSTAIN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
All constitutionally entrenched rights are, subject to constitu-
tionally authorized limitations, available to religious people and insti-
tutions.130 Some rights are, however, pertinently supportive of typical 
religious activities, such as preaching, witnessing, proselytizing, as-
sembling, and charitable work. These rights can only briefly be men-
tioned. 
 
 126. See id. ch. 9, § 185. 
 127. See id. § 29(3). 
 128. See id. § 29(4). 
 129. 1996 (4) BCLR 537 (CC) paras. 7, 9. 
 130. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108, 1996) ch. 2, § 8(4). 
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Section 16(1) of the final Constitution guarantees a right to 
freedom of expression, thereby catering to the need of religious indi-
viduals and communities to freely “speak out” for their religion and 
to criticize and challenge social and political structures and policies in 
terms of the teachings of their religion. Section 16(2), however, ex-
plicitly limits the exercise of this right by prohibiting propaganda for 
war,131 the incitement of imminent violence,132 and “hate speech,” 
namely, “advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender 
or religion . . . that constitutes incitement to cause harm.”133 Argua-
bly, these limitations are aimed at inculcating tolerance. It has as yet 
not been determined exactly how far they extend. Does criticism and 
denunciation of a religion or belief, for instance, amount to “advo-
cacy of hatred based on . . . religion”? And what about vigorous 
proselytizing, which inevitably deprecates “competing religions” to 
at least some extent? 
Other entrenched rights demonstrably supportive of typical reli-
gious activities include the rights to freedom of association134 and 
movement135 as well as the rights to assemble, demonstrate, picket, 
and present petitions.136 Finally, it is important for religious commu-
nities to know that they have a right to just administrative action 
(where activities of the executive branch of government stand to im-
pact on their day to day activities), including a right to written rea-
sons for administrative action adversely affecting their rights.137 Reli-
gious individuals and groups, furthermore, have a right of access to 
information required for the exercise or protection of any of their 
rights.138 
VIII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
It is still too early to draw definite conclusions from patterns in 
the constitutional treatment of law and religion issues in the “new 
 
 131. See id. ch. 2, § 16(2)(a). 
 132. See id. ch. 2, § 16(2)(b). 
 133. See id. ch. 2, § 16(2)(c). The general limitation clause, section 36(1), arguably also 
caters to such limitations. Specific limitations which are also subject to a general limitation 
clause raise technical problems of their own (albeit not insurmountable). 
 134. See id. § 18. 
 135. See id. § 21(1). 
 136. See id. § 17. 
 137. See id. § 33(1)–(2). 
 138. See id. § 32(1). 
3DUP-FIN.DOC 6/25/01  9:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
464 
South Africa.” South Africa’s population of roughly 40 million 
shows a high degree of religious pluralism. Christianity holds a clear 
majority position, but, within Christianity itself, there is a breathtak-
ing denominational diversity spread over more than thirty-four reli-
gious groups and several thousand denominations.139 Given such di-
versity and the potent entrenchment of religious rights and freedom 
in the Constitution, one would have expected much more litigation 
on religious issues during the past six years. Religious rights litigation 
so far has largely been an elitist concern: either the parties initiating 
the litigation were elitist—for example, a select group of Christian 
professionals (e.g., Christian Lawyers Association) or a disgruntled 
atheist mother who sent her daughter to a prestigious private school 
(e.g., Wittmann)—or the issues were essentially yuppie concerns, for 
example, wine sales on Sundays (e.g., Seven-Eleven) or corporal pun-
ishment in prestigious Christian private schools (e.g., Christian Edu-
cation). Of course, the abortion issue raised in Christian Lawyers As-
sociation concerns millions of poor people in South Africa too, but 
the fact that the litigation did not really involve grassroots applicants 
to a large extent resulted in “real people’s issues” not being can-
vassed. On the other hand, cases such as Ryland and Amod were sig-
nificant to a large number of Islamic women disadvantaged by the 
law. 
Religious groups in South Africa must yet learn to organize 
themselves for the purpose of asserting their rights under the Consti-
tution which so generously protects them. During the final years of 
apartheid, a National Inter-Faith Conference held in Pretoria in No-
vember 1992 raised hopes that such action was forthcoming.140 At 
this event, organized by the South African Chapter of the World 
Conference on Religion and Peace, representatives of various reli-
gious communities agreed on a freedom of religion clause to be in-
cluded in a future South African constitution. The Conference fur-
thermore adopted a Declaration on Religious Rights and 
Responsibilities.141 This Conference was a remarkable achievement in 
tolerance and inter-religious understanding, but it bore no tangible 
 
 139. For statistical information, see Gouws & du Plessis, supra note 3, at 659–61. 
 140. See generally World Conference on Religion and Peace South African Chapter, Believ-
ers in the Future, Proceedings of the National Inter-Faith Conference on Religion-State Relations, 
Dec. 2–4, 1990 (visited Jan. 21, 2001) <http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/ricsa/commiss/trc/ 
wcrp_sub.htm>. 
 141. See 82 JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA 107–110 (1993). 
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fruits after 1994. 
 
It is of particular importance that religious groups assert their 
rights in adjudicative fora. This article has referred to South Africa’s 
courts’ (including the Constitutional Court) tendency to dispose of 
law and religion issues in a mostly libertarian and individualistic, free 
exercise vein, thereby underplaying issues related to the evenhanded 
treatment of religious groups. A broadly conceived “establishment” 
jurisprudence can only develop if religious groups, communities, and 
institutions take their concerns to court. 
The South African courts, and the Constitutional Court in par-
ticular, are to be criticized for what appears to be their over-emphasis 
on issues touching the free exercise of religion at the cost of broadly 
conceived establishment concerns. The courts have, possibly with the 
exception of the five judges of the Constitutional Court in Seven-
Eleven,142 not sufficiently availed themselves of the opportunity to 
develop a nuanced jurisprudence on the evenhanded treatment of di-
versity of religions in South Africa. The constitutional text most cer-
tainly allows ample room for such an enriching construction of reli-
gious rights and freedom. As previously noted, there is the potential 
of provisions such as sections 15(2) and (3) and section 31(1) of the 
1996 Constitution to spearhead a penetration of the wall of separa-
tion between church (or organized religion) and state (or “official” 
politics)143 erected pursuant to the impoverished and narrow version 
of American establishment clause jurisprudence.144 Section 7(2) of 
the South African Constitution, couched in strikingly affirmative 
language, can lend further impetus to such a maneuver. This provi-
sion requires the state, first, to protect the rights contained in the 
Bill of Rights, and, second, to promote and fulfill these rights. This 
certainly strengthens the state’s arms to actuate the freedom of diverse 
religions impartially and evenhandedly, instead of ducking from relig-
ion. It is a prime responsibility of the South African judiciary to 
explore and recommend dependable and constitutionally feasible 
ways to do this. 
In conclusion, it must be stressed that the actual realization of 
religious rights and freedom does not and will not solely, or even 
 
 142. See supra Part V.C. 
 143. See supra Part VI.A–C. 
 144. See supra Part V.A. 
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primarily, depend on the courts. The inculcation of a culture of tol-
erance or, rather, an appreciation of diversity and mutual respect is, 
and will remain, vital. There are no recent empirical studies that give 
an indication of tolerance at the grassroots level. Previous studies 
have revealed high levels of primarily political intolerance but with 
significant spillovers into religion.145 Religious individuals, institu-
tions, groups, and communities have a vital role to play in addressing 
and redressing inter-individual and inter-group intolerance and con-
flict. It is not inappropriate to involve the state’s adjudicative fora in 
this endeavor from time to time. But it must be understood that liti-
gation on religious rights and the resulting jurisprudence present re-
ligious individuals and communities with but a roadmap of how to 
address religious liberty issues in accordance with the high demands 
of positive tolerance. 
 
 145. See, e.g., J.L. Gibson & A. Gouws, Political Tolerance in the Emerging South Afri-
can Democracy (1997) (unpublished paper prepared for The American Political Science Asso-
ciation Conference); A. Gouws, Political Tolerance in the Context of South Africa (1992) (un-
published Ph.D. thesis) (on file with author). Gouws and du Plessis contend that, although 
attitude surveys have shown that South Africa is a highly intolerant country, it is rarely argued 
that South Africans are religiously intolerant. See Gouws & du Plessis, supra note 3, at 658–59. 
